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ARTICLE
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Commentators analyzing the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in
Graham v. Florida, which prohibited sentences of life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes, have generally done so in substantive
proportionality terms, ignoring or downplaying parole in the process. This Article
challenges that approach, focusing on the intersection of proportionality and
parole as a jumping-off point. Taking parole seriously makes clear that
Graham is difficult to understand solely in terms of substantive proportionality
concepts like individual culpability and punishment severity. Instead, the decision can be seen as establishing a rule of constitutional criminal procedure, one
that links the validity of punishment to the institutional structure of sentencing.
By requiring the State to revisit its first-order sentencing judgments at a later
point in time, Graham mandates a procedural space for granular, individualized, and ultimately more reliable sentencing determinations. I expose this procedural and institutional side of parole’s constitutional significance, situate it
within the constitutional landscape of sentencing, and sketch some of its implications for the future of sentencing regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida prohibited sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life in prison without the possi1
bility of parole, commentators hailed the case as a watershed deci2
decision. Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges to sentences
3
of imprisonment, long viewed as dead, had been resurrected. Legal
scholars have showered attention on Graham in the two years since it
4
was decided. But despite an ever-expanding literature, the signifi5
cance of parole to the decision remains almost entirely unexplored.
1

130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
See, e.g., John “Evan” Gibbs, Jurisprudential Juxtaposition: Application of Graham v.
Florida to Adult Sentences, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 957, 957 (2011) (characterizing Graham
as a “landmark decision” that “breathed new life” into proportionality analysis); Scott R.
Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law
Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 409-10 (2011) (“The decision is unquestionably landmark . . . .”); Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without
Parole?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1-2 (2010) (noting the large volume of expert commentary on Graham within five months of the decision and that “Graham adopted a new methodology for reviewing Eighth Amendment challenges to noncapital sentences”).
3
Before Graham, outside of the capital punishment context, “the Court . . . treated
the proportionality requirement as so undemanding as to be nearly meaningless.”
O’Hear, supra note 2, at 2; see also John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 80 (2010) (“It is
time . . . to pronounce the body of Eighth Amendment quantitative proportionality
dead . . . .”).
4
See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws,
71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010); Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP.
49 (2010); Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All: Graham v. Florida and the
Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 V T. L. REV. 1 (2011); William
W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death: The Argument for According
Life Without Parole Its Own Category of Heightened Review Under the Eighth Amendment After
Graham v. Florida, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010); Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy’s Vision of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 66 (2010); Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012);
Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News—And Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54 (2010); Gibbs,
supra note 2; Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 58
(2010); Dan Markel, May Minors Be Retributively Punished After Panetti (and Graham)?, 23
FED. SENT’G REP. 62 (2010); Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v.
Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (2011); Eva S. Nilsen, From Harmelin to Graham—
Justice Kennedy Stakes Out a Path to Proportional Punishment, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 67
(2010); Richard M. Ré, Can Congress Overturn Graham v. Florida?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’ Y 367 (2010); Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED.
2
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On one level, this is mystifying. After all, parole was the distinguishing factor in Graham between a constitutional and unconstitutional life sentence. On another level, it is hardly shocking. Criminal
law scholarship has long neglected parole and other “back-end”
6
sentencing mechanisms. This is due in large part to criminal law theorists’ traditional view of sentencing as an overwhelmingly substantive
7
concern, divorced from questions of procedural or institutional design.

SENT’G REP. 75 (2010); Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “‘Death is Different’ No Longer”:
Graham v. Florida and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327;
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In: The Supreme Court
Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79 (2010); The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading
Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 209, 215-19 (2010); Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t
Know Why It Is That You Threw Your Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, The Supreme
Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35 (2010); Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham
v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/smithcohen.pdf.
5
Alice Ristroph is the only scholar to have touched on the issue, and she has done
so only briefly. See Ristroph, supra note 4, at 76 (addressing the potential relevance of
parole ineligibility to punishment severity under the Eighth Amendment). For a review
and critique of Ristroph’s discussion, see infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
6
See Laura I. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1307, 1307 (2007) (“Largely concealed from the public eye, components of hidden
sentencing such as probation, parole, and post-release supervision have been ignored
by both scholars and policy-makers.”); Jeremy Travis & Kirsten Christiansen, Failed
Reentry: The Challenges of Back-End Sentencing, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249,
249-50 (2006) (noting that back-end sentencing “has largely escaped the attention of
scholars, advocates, legislators and analysts”). Recent and insightful exceptions can be
found in the work of David Ball, Steven Chanenson, and Michael O’Hear. See W. David
Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentences, and the Meaning of
Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893 (2009) [hereinafter Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and
Cruel ]; W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 395
(2011) [hereinafter Ball, Normative Elements]; Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above
and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175, 186-89 (2005) [hereinafter Chanenson, Guidance from
Above]; Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 43240 (2005) [hereinafter Chanenson, The Next Era]; Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247 (2011).
7
See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006) (noting that “structural and procedural principles for sentencing have rarely received sustained attention”). A noteworthy exception to this is
the explosion of recent scholarship on the implications of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), for the institutional design of sentencing. See, e.g., Ball, Heinous,
Atrocious, and Cruel, supra note 6; Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional
Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2002); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s
Domain, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 297; Douglas A. Berman, Should Juries Be the Guide for Adventures Through Apprendi-Land?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 65 (2009), http://
www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/65_Berman.pdf.
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Sentencing has largely been treated as a static, unitary act of punishment, the validity of which can be judged at the moment the sentencing gavel falls. Because courts and academics widely view Eighth
Amendment proportionality as a substantive sentencing principle, these same tendencies—the tendency to evaluate sentences at a single
slice in time, and by reference to familiar substantive debates about
culpability, punishment severity, and how well a sentence deters, incapacitates, rehabilitates, and delivers retribution—dominate doctrine
and scholarship in that area as well. Commentators, taking their cues
from the Court, have thus seen Graham as an extension of the substan8
tive proportionality principles of cases like Roper v. Simmons and Atkins
9
v. Virginia. They have analyzed Graham as a substantive rule, ignoring
10
or downplaying parole in the process.
This Article challenges that approach, focusing on the paroleproportionality intersection as a jumping-off point. Doing so is fruitful
because, as this Article shows, the intersection of parole and proportionality strikes at the heart of the larger substance-procedure divide
that infects sentencing law generally. By substance-procedure divide, I
mean the divide between questions concerning the “what” and “why”
of sentences (what sentence may be imposed, and why), on the one
hand, and questions concerning the “how” and “who” of sentences
(how do we make sentencing decisions, and who sentences), on the
other. The former concerns the substantive results of sentences; the
latter concerns the procedural rules that govern sentencing. Taking
parole seriously makes clear that Graham cannot be understood solely—
or even primarily—as a purely substantive limit on punishment, concerned only with the question of “what.” Instead, it makes sense to see
Graham as equally concerned with the question of “how.” The decision
establishes a rule of constitutional criminal procedure, one that links
the validity of punishment to the institutional structure of sentencing.
By requiring the State to revisit its first-order sentencing judgments at
a later point in time, Graham mandates a procedural space for granular, textured, and ultimately more reliable sentencing determinations.
In doing so, it underscores the importance of institutional design to

8

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
10
See sources cited supra note 4. Indeed, not one sustained examination of the role
of parole in Graham exists in an entire Federal Sentencing Reporter issue devoted to the
Graham decision. See generally Life Without Parole, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1 (2010).
9
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the constitutional regulation of punishment beyond the Sixth
11
Amendment context of Apprendi v. New Jersey.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I sets
out parole’s puzzle for proportionality and explains the limits of viewing Graham—and the Eighth Amendment significance of parole—
through a classic proportionality lens. Part II explores the overlooked
procedural and institutional side of Graham. It shows how the interaction of substance and procedure that drives the constitutional significance of parole makes Graham more the cousin of Woodson v. North
12
13
Carolina, Lockett v. Ohio, and other “super due process for death”
cases than that of Roper, Atkins, and other proportionality cases. Like
Graham, and unlike Roper and Atkins, those cases do not foreclose any
actual punishment; rather, they aim at morally reliable sentences by
laying down a procedural requirement of individualized, textured sentencing, roughly analogous to how parole functions in Graham. Part
III sketches some implications of this account. Recognizing parole’s
procedural significance illuminates how Graham continues Apprendi’s
project of linking institutional design to punishment legitimacy,
breaks down traditional barriers within sentencing, and lays the foundation for the increased importance of sentencing explanations at the
back end of the sentencing process.
I. PAROLE AND PROPORTIONALITY
Parole presents a puzzle for proportionality. Proportionality eschews any one purpose of punishment and weighs the severity of sentences against the characteristics of the offense and the offender at the
time of the offense. Parole turns on notions of rehabilitation and riskmanagement and involves highly discretionary release decisions based
heavily on post-offense developments. This Part shows how mixing the
two scrambles conventional proportionality principles for concepts
like culpability and punishment severity. Section I.A provides a brief
definitional, historical, and constitutional context of parole. Using

11

See 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires any
fact other than the fact of a prior conviction that increases a sentence beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum to be presented to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
12
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
13
438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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Graham as a foil, Section I.B explores the difficulties with trying to fit
the constitutional significance of parole into the proportionality box.
A. Parole in Context
“Parole” has multiple meanings, but I use it here in a particular
way—as did the Court in Graham—as referring to a discretionary early
release decision, made by a parole board or similar authority, based
14
When
upon its review of an individual prisoner’s circumstances.
American criminal justice reformers introduced this vision of parole
over a century ago, rehabilitation was the dominant approach to sen15
tencing and corrections. In the indeterminate sentencing regimes of
the time, parole boards—which were then and still are largely executive branch agencies—were critical institutional players in determining
16
a sentence’s length. They did so by deciding on a case-by-case basis
whether and when each individual offender was ready to be returned
17
to the community. The factors governing those decisions were broad
and varied and involved a wide range of both forward- and backwardlooking considerations. They included things like the offender’s participation in prison programs; infractions of prison rules; job opportunities upon release; family ties; the seriousness of the original offense;
expressions of remorse and repentance; the risk of recidivism; and the

14

Parole can also mean mandatory release, although I do not use the term that way
in this Article. Between 1976 and 1999, the fraction of parole releases that were discretionary fell from sixty-five percent to twenty-four percent; in other words, more than
three-quarters of parole releases are now automatic by operation of law. JEREMY TRAVIS
& SARAH LAWRENCE, BEYOND THE PRISON GATES: THE STATE OF PAROLE IN AMERICA 4-5
(2002). Yet due to the explosion in size of the modern prison population, the absolute
number of discretionary releases actually increased during that same period. Id. at 5.
Whether release is discretionary or mandatory, parole also can refer to an offender’s
status as having been released and being under parole supervision—i.e., being “paroled” or “on parole.” Again, I do not use the term that way in this Article.
15
See Daniel Weiss, California’s Inequitable Parole System: A Proposal to Reestablish Fairness, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1584 (2005) (“Historically, the rehabilitation and reintegration of the parolee into society were the goals of the parole system.”).
16
See TRAVIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 4 (contrasting discretionary release
systems that use parole boards with mandatory release systems in which legal rules
govern release); Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2005) (noting parole boards’ historic “broad or plenary authority to release prisoners, subject, usually, only to the maximum prison term set
by the judge or the legislature”).
17
See TRAVIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing individualized nature of
parole release decisions); Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release
Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 578-79 (1994) (comparing a parole
board’s discretion to that of a judge in sentencing).
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views of victims, community members, prosecutors, or sentencing
18
judges.
Parole fell from favor as sentencing discretion came under attack
in the 1970s, determinate sentencing systems replaced indeterminate
ones, and retribution replaced rehabilitation as a favored aim of pun19
ishment. Modern day parole boards began to focus their release de20
cisions more on managing dangerousness than anything else. But
even then, the individualized, contextual, and ultimately normative
nature of the inquiry remained the same, with most boards continuing
21
to consider some mix of the sorts of factors just described.

18

See, e.g., DON M. GOTTFREDSON ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING:
A POLICY CONTROL METHOD 8, 23 (1978); TRAVIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 26
n.16; Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing
and Parole, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 347, 399 (Michael Tonry
ed., 2009); Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal Defendants Should Avoid
the Alford Plea, 68 MO. L. REV. 913, 933 (2003); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.9
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (listing several post-conviction factors to be considered in
parole release determinations, such as “any apparent development in [the prisoner’s]
personality which may promote or hinder his conformity to law” and “the prisoner’s
conduct in the institution”).
19
See TRAVIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 2 (“As indeterminate sentencing came
under scrutiny in the 1970s, so did parole. . . . As the goal of rehabilitation lost support
and the goals of ‘just deserts’ and retribution found new adherents, parole’s mission to
support prisoner reintegration was called into question.” (footnote omitted)). The
attack on sentencing discretion began in earnest with Judge Marvin Frankel’s famous
critique of unbridled discretion as a source of massive and unjust sentencing disparities. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
20
See Joshua Stengel, Parole’s Function, Purpose, and Role in the Criminal Justice System,
NAT’L INST. CORRECTIONS (Aug. 30, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://community.nicic.gov/
blogs/parole/archive/2010/08/30/parole-s-function-purpose-and-role-in-the-criminaljustice-system.aspx (describing how risk assessment and public safety concerns have begun
to dominate release decisions); see also, e.g., In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 549 (Cal. 2008)
(“[T]he [California] Penal Code and corresponding regulations establish that the fundamental consideration in parole decisions is public safety . . . . Moreover . . . the core
determination of ‘public safety’ under the statute and corresponding regulations involves
an assessment of an inmate’s current dangerousness.” (citations omitted)); Stewart v. Pa.
Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 714 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (“[T]he legislature
has sent a message to the Parole Board that public safety is now the paramount issue in
parole decision-making.”); In re Thomas, 147 Wash. App. 1048, 1049 (2008) (“[The
statute] directs the ISRB to give public safety considerations the highest priority when
making parole decisions . . . .”).
21
See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 17003, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 4-14 (1999), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=820 (describing how state boards
approach parole decisions and listing factors that shape those decisions); Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 397-98 (noting that, in California, the information used in
parole risk assessments includes things like “the offender’s social history, criminal his-
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The deeply discretionary nature of parole release decisions is reflected in a constitutional doctrine that commits parole to the virtually
unfettered judgment of the states and their parole boards. Courts view
parole decisions as “equity-type” determinations that involve “predictive judgment[s]” about “what is best both for the individual inmate
22
and for the community.” They are “discretionary assessment[s] of a
multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and
23
what he may become rather than simply what he has done.” Courts
accordingly afford parole only the most anemic procedural due process protections. Parole release decisions require the most minimal
opportunity to be heard, the barest statement of reasons, and the
24
The upshot, as
weakest evidentiary support on appellate review.
David Ball puts it, is that “a parole board is free to deny parole for
25
whatever reason, on whatever facts, for however long.” There is no

tory, and commitment offense,” and is “centered entirely around the individual prisoner” (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2281(b) (2010))); id. at 407-08 (observing that
“[d]esert entwines itself” in the risk release assessments that go into parole decisions
and that “desert is considered not in the abstract—whether this kind of person deserves
release—but in the concrete—whether this particular person deserves release”); see also
Miller v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (App. Div. 2010) (noting the
parole board’s consideration of “the petitioner’s institutional record, including his
disciplinary record, program accomplishments, academic achievements, and postrelease living arrangements, as well as the violent circumstances of his crime, his criminal
history, and his continued claim of innocence” in making its release decision (citations
omitted)). The data and psychiatric and behavioral science that parole boards use to
assess these factors have grown much more sophisticated in recent years. See Shelley L.
Brown et al., The Dynamic Prediction of Criminal Recidivism: A Three-Wave Prospective Study,
33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 28-29 (2009) (discussing static and dynamic risk factors used
to predict criminal recidivism).
22
Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 375 (1987) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates
of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979)).
23
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert—Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813 (1961)).
24
See, e.g., id. at 16 (describing the constitutional requirements of opportunity to
be heard and notice of denial); Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel, supra note 6, at 94450 (reviewing procedural due process constraints on parole decisionmaking). To use
David Ball’s words, the Court’s procedural due process cases addressing parole have
been “messy” and “underdefined.” Id. at 944.
25
Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel, supra note 6, at 944.
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enforceable substantive constitutional right to parole release.
27
can grant or deny parole as they see fit.

States

B. Parole’s Puzzle for Proportionality
28

It was against this backdrop that the Court decided Graham. The
decision put parole’s significance to the constitutional regulation of
punishment at center stage. Or at least it should have. Although parole
was critical to the outcome, the Court barely discussed it. The Court
instead folded parole into its “independent judgment” of disproportionality, which rested on three factors: lack of “legitimate penological
29
justification” for juvenile life without parole, juvenile nonhomicide
30
31
offenders’ “limited culpability,” and the punishment’s “severity.”
26

See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1983) (“[T]here is no constitutional or inherent right to parole and the Constitution itself does not guarantee goodtime credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison despite the undoubted impact of
such credits on the freedom of inmates.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (observing that
there is no constitutional entitlement to parole).
27
See Allen, 482 U.S. at 377 n.8, 378 (“[A] State has no duty to establish a parole system or to provide for parole for all categories of convicted persons, and . . . may place
conditions on parole release.” (citation omitted)); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10 (noting
that for discretionary parole release, “there is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a
decision favorable to the individual”). The Court reaffirmed this principle in a recent
post-Graham decision. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam)
(“There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before
the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to
their prisoners.” (citation omitted)). States may, however, create a state law entitlement to parole through state statute or regulation. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7-8. Where a
state does so, procedural due process protections apply. Id. at 7.
28
Terrance Graham had been on probation for earlier crimes that carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole when, just thirty-four
days shy of his eighteenth birthday, he committed an armed home burglary. Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010). A Florida trial judge sentenced him to life without parole for the original crimes, and an intermediate state appellate court affirmed,
finding that Graham had “rejected his second chance” and that he was incapable of
rehabilitation. Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The Supreme Court reversed, categorically barring sentences of life without parole as disproportionate for all juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
29
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
30
Id. at 2030.
31
Id. I do not mean to dismiss the significance of either the objective prong of
Graham’s proportionality inquiry or its shift in applying the proportionality test from
the capital context to the noncapital context—a shift that a prominent commentator
has rightly characterized as “monumental.” Barkow, supra note 4, at 50. But the objective test, without more, merely reflects existing standards—whether they concern life
without parole or any other sentencing practice—as expressed in legislative enactments

Bierschbach FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

1754

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

5/15/2012 11:34 AM

[Vol. 160: 1745

Each of these—penological justifications, culpability, and severity—is a
classic Eighth Amendment proportionality consideration, and in
relying on them, the Court hewed closely to the approach it had taken
32
five years earlier in Roper. By injecting parole into the mix, however,
Graham scrambled each factor significantly and raised more questions
than it answered about how parole and proportionality intersect.
First, take Graham’s point about legitimate penological justifications.
The “purposes of punishment” test, as this factor has come to be called,
33
is based on the Eighth Amendment’s principle of penal agnosticism.
Penal agnosticism holds that “the Eighth Amendment does not man34
date adoption of any one penological theory”; it is, in other words,
agnostic with respect to the sentencing practices and punitive goals
embodied in state laws. Thus, a sentence is not disproportionate as
long as it advances “the goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
35
rehabilitation.” Over the last few decades, the Court and its individual members have frequently invoked penal agnosticism to uphold
36
what by any standard were extremely harsh sentences, including, in
Harmelin, a life sentence without parole for a first-time felon convicted
37
of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.

and state practice. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 564-68 (2005). It tells us nothing independent about the relationship of parole to
substantive proportionality principles.
32
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568, 571; Barkow, supra note 4, at 50 (discussing the centrality of Roper to Graham’s reasoning).
33
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at 58-59 (discussing the “purposes of punishment test”
and stating that the Court has resisted commitment to a specific theory of punishment).
34
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). As Justice O’Connor observed in Ewing v. California,
decisions about penological purposes are generally seen as legislative choices to which
reviewing courts owe deference, particularly under principles of federalism. See 538 U.S.
11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also id. (“Our traditional deference to legislative
policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution ‘does not mandate
adoption of any one penological theory.’” (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
35
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (citing Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25).
36
See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25-26; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85
(1980); see also Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a “Rational Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 290
(2007) (“In the [Eighth Amendment] morass . . . one theme has remained consistent:
the Court insists that the Constitution is agnostic when it comes to penological purposes.
That is, states are free to choose their penal goals and to structure their punitive practices to achieve those goals.”).
37
501 U.S. at 961.
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But, if that is the case, then what is the constitutional problem with
eliminating a sentencing practice like parole, even for juvenile nonhomicide offenders? Doing so advances at least some permissible sentencing goals, including incapacitation and deterrence. It incapacitates
by keeping young criminals—a number of whom, empirically, will be
38
recidivists—off the streets. It deters by sending an unmistakable message to other potential young offenders—some of whom will be con39
templating serious crimes—that there are no second chances. The
Court has accepted these purposes before as sufficient to uphold what
might plausibly be seen as equally harsh sentences, including, for example, a sentence of twenty-five years to life under California’s “three40
strikes” law for the theft of three golf clubs in Ewing v. California.
Ewing stressed that tough recidivist statutes further incapacitation and
41
deterrence and that states are free to choose their sentencing goals.
Rummel v. Estelle made a similar point when affirming a three-strikes
42
life sentence for passing a bad check for $120.75. Framed as a substantive sentencing rule, Graham moves away from these cases by placing limits on a state’s pursuit of otherwise valid penological ends.
The conceptual source of those limits, and their relationship to
parole, is muddy. The Court glossed over the boundaries of penal agnosticism, noting only that “incapacitation cannot override all other
43
considerations.” But it never clearly explained what those other considerations were. The Court’s observation that “life without pa38

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2053 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Candace Zierdt, The Little
Engine That Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track,
33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 422 (1999).
39
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2053-54 (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 621 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s contention that the goals
of retribution and deterrence are not served by executing murderers under 18
is . . . transparently false.”). Eliminating parole might also advance retributive goals, at
least under some conceptions of retributivism. Cf. id. (similiar); Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 315-16 (2005) (discussing
difficulties with disproving the claim that neither prison nor the death penalty serves
any retributive purpose for juveniles).
40
538 U.S. at 30.
41
Id. at 25-26.
42
445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980); see also id. (noting that the purposes of recidivist
statutes are deterrence and incapacitation, and that it is “largely within the discretion
of the punishing jurisdiction” to determine the length of time for which a recidivist
must be isolated from society).
43
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029; see also Lee, supra note 4, at 59 (observing that “the
Court has been trying to avoid engaging with deep philosophical issues about the purposes of punishment and what limitations should be placed on it”).
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role . . . improperly denies . . . a chance to demonstrate growth and
44
maturity” did little to illuminate the issue. Aside from its obvious falsity—even individuals imprisoned for life can still demonstrate growth
45
and maturity, which a number of “lifers” do —the observation is
meaningless without a link to some substantive constitutional standard
for parole, which has never existed and which Graham steadfastly
46
refused to create.
What drove the Court’s decision in the end was its independent
judgment on the other two factors, culpability and severity. It was not
that incapacitation and deterrence no longer mattered for juveniles.
It was that marginally advancing those goals by eliminating parole
could not be justified in light of juveniles’ “diminished moral respon47
Graham
sibility” and the harshness of the punishment imposed.
might thus be seen as part of a trend in recent proportionality deci48
sions—including Roper, Atkins, Kennedy v. Louisiana, and Panetti v.
49
Quarterman —that suggests the ascendancy of retributive limitations
on punishment over the Court’s professed agnosticism toward peno50
Graham, however, was more of a leap than just
logical purposes.
44

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, How Empirical Studies Can Affect Positively the Politics of the
Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1431, 1436 n.32 (1998) (“After a few years, lifers become your better prisoners. . . . They tend to be a calming influence on the younger
kids, and we have more problems with people serving short terms.” (citation omitted)).
46
See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text; infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text; see also Ristroph, supra note 4, at 76 (observing that the Graham Court framed
its holding “as a negative right, not a positive one”).
47
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
48
See 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (prohibiting imposition of the death penalty for the
rape of a child).
49
See 551 U.S. 930, 932 (2007) (reaffirming that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of a mentally incompetent offender and establishing standards and procedures for determining competency).
50
For helpful discussions in recent Eighth Amendment scholarship of evidence of
this trend, see Lee, supra note 4, at 58-60, Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti
and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1212-15, 1213 n.189
(2009), Steiker & Steiker, supra note 4, at 79-82, and Steiker, supra note 36, at 294-95.
See generally Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L.
REV. 677, 737 (2005) (discussing the basic conflict between the purposes of punishment test and retributive limitations on punishment and arguing that “the Eighth
Amendment places a limitation on how we may pursue the purposes of punishment”).
Importantly, saying that retributivism trumps penal agnosticism does not render
the latter a dead letter. Within retributive constraints, penal agnosticism still rules, and
states remain free to design punitive institutions and structure sentencing goals as they
see fit. See Kyron Huigens, On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, 18 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’ Y 465, 477-78 (2004) (distinguishing between theories and ends
of punishment). It may well be that the Court is simultaneously agnostic about the
45
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another step, because it extended that trend beyond the capital context for the first time.
Graham’s treatment of culpability and severity likewise upends settled understandings. As just suggested, culpability and severity are the
two sides of the retributivist coin: as embodied in the Eighth Amendment, retributivist limitations on punishment prohibit punishing an
offender excessively in relation to his culpability. More specifically,
they prohibit punishing an offender more severely than other equally
51
or more culpable offenders, whatever purposes doing so might serve.
Such “negative” or “limiting” retributivism has become an acknowl52
edged mainstay of the Court’s modern proportionality doctrine. It was
the raison d’être behind Roper and Atkins’s categorical holdings that juvenile and mentally retarded offenders’ diminished culpability rendered
53
death too severe a punishment for their crimes. Graham relied on it
54
heavily to reach its analogous conclusion for life without parole.
In linking negative retributivism to a requirement of parole, however, the Court did not explain how parole, culpability, and severity
interrelate. The answer is far from clear. Classic retributive culpability
is static and backward-looking. It is “concerned only with the offend-

ends of punishment a state may pursue, but not agnostic about what is a constitutionally
permissible theory of and justification for punishment. Cf. id. The Court, however, has
yet to draw that distinction or to explain if that is indeed the case.
51
See Lee, supra note 50, at 689-91 (outlining the basic Eighth Amendment approach to retributivism).
52
Negative retributivism prohibits punishing offenders excessively in relation to
their culpability. Positive retributivism, by contrast, requires punishing offenders in
proportion to their culpability. Negative retributivism can be of two types: noncomparative and comparative. Noncomparative negative retributivism measures excessiveness in absolute terms; an offender cannot be punished more severely than his
culpability would warrant, even if all other equally culpable offenders receive the same
punishment. Comparative negative retributivism measures excessiveness in relative
terms; an offender cannot be punished more severely than other equally or more culpable offenders. I refer only to the comparative variety here, because it is the one most
evident in the Court’s proportionality jurisprudence and in scholarly treatments of the
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 714-20 (reviewing comparative negative retributivism in
Eighth Amendment cases and highlighting its importance in judicial enforcement of
retributivism). For comparisons of negative and positive retributivism, see R.A. DUFF,
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 11-12 (2001), J.L. Mackie, Retributivism: A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 677, 678 ( J oel Feinberg &
Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed. 1991), and Markel, supra note 50, at 1214-16.
53
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-72 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 317-21 (2002).
54
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (considering “the culpability
of the offenders at issue . . . along with the severity of the punishment in question”).
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55

er’s wrongful act and the circumstances surrounding it” —for example, the harm caused (or wrong committed), and the offender’s men56
tal state and conduct at the time of the offense. Some aspects of
Graham’s culpability analysis—such as its focus on the moral difference
between homicide and nonhomicide crimes and juveniles’ developmental immaturity and susceptibility to influence—accorded with that
57
conception. Others did not. The Court, for example, made much of
the “transient” character of juveniles and the “greater possibil58
ity . . . that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.” Why?
Postoffense changes in character, expressions of remorse, or repentance
have little to do with harm, mental state, or conduct at the time of the
59
offense. They thus should not matter to classic retributive culpability.
To be sure, they might still matter to some other versions of re60
tributivism, such as character retributivism.
Under that theory, a
propensity for change might be relevant to culpability if it could be
taken as evidence of a less “hardened” character at the time a crime is

55

Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 107 (2004).
56
See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1383, 1408 (2002); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1445 (2004).
57
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27. Each of these is at least arguably relevant to culpability at the time of the offense.
58
Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
59
As Stephen Garvey writes,
Retributivism holds that punishment is justified when it is deserved. . . .
[R]etributivism is deontological and backward-looking. In contrast to forwardlooking consequentialist approaches that justify punishment in the name of
what might be, retributivism justifies punishment in the name of what has
been. Punishment strictly predicated on moral desert is blind to the future.
Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORL. REV. 989, 1012 (1996); see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and
Mercy (comparing grievance retributivism and character retributivism and explaining
that a wrongdoer’s repentance should have no effect on the former), in REPENTANCE:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 143, 149 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997).
60
Character retributivism holds that a wrongdoer’s culpability is a function not only of his wrongful acts, but also of his character. See Murphy, supra note 59, at 149 (explaining that under character retributivism, “one’s deserts are a function not merely of
one’s wrongful act, but also of the ultimate state of one’s character”); Carol S. Steiker,
Murphy on Mercy: A Prudential Reconsideration, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 2008, at
45, 47 (similiar); B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resurrection from a Death Sentence: Why
Capital Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Transformation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1123-30 (2001) (discussing features of character retributivism, including the idea that wrongdoers should be punished in proportion to their
own inner wickedness).
NELL
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61

committed. Roper’s discussion of juveniles’ culpability, on which Gra62
ham explicitly drew, appears to have had such a notion in mind.
But if that is the point, then what is the relevance of parole? If less
“hardened” juveniles truly are less culpable at the time of the offense
than are their nonhomicidal adult counterparts, and if the maximum
allowable punishment for the adults is life imprisonment, then proper
application of negative retributivism should mean that the juveniles
cannot be imprisoned for life. From the standpoint of retributive culpability, a constitutional requirement that we draw out the time frame
of sentencing by years or decades does not make much sense. If we
know everything we need to know about culpability now, then a parole
board does not need to take a second look later on. Life imprisonment for nonhomicidal juveniles, even through repeated denials of
63
parole, should be off the table.
Unless, that is, the constitutional significance of parole turns not
on culpability, but on severity. A parole-eligible life sentence might
simply be considered less severe than a parole-ineligible life sentence.
If that were the case, all else being equal, a (less culpable) juvenile
61

See Murphy, supra note 59, at 151 (observing that for character retributivism, “repentance might well play a crucial role” in determining desert, because “a repentant
person seems to reveal a better character than an unrepentant person”); Robbins, supra
note 60, at 1123 (arguing that because “character affects desert,” change in character is
relevant to punishment deserved).
62
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed
by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2016 (emphasizing “Roper’s holding that because juveniles have lessened culpability
they are less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment” (citing Roper, 543 U.S.
at 551)); see also Lee, supra note 50, at 724-25 (discussing Roper’s application of negative
retributivism).
63
To frame the same point about culpability another way, one might, as Kyron
Huigens does, distinguish between the two types of culpability involved with classic and
character retributivism. Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1196, 1219, 1228-30 (2000). The culpability of classic retributivism is culpability in
wrongdoing; it concerns mens rea, the fault elements of offenses, and the wrong committed. Id. at 1230-31. The culpability of character retributivism is culpability of the
offender; it concerns responsible moral agency and the justness of imposing punishment on individuals who lack agency, such as an insane person or a minor. Id. at 123839. If a juvenile can be sentenced to any kind of life imprisonment, with or without
parole, then he must have sufficient moral agency to make that a just punishment. But
as a juvenile ages, he acquires greater moral agency, all things being equal. As to culpability of the offender, then, a parole board cannot possibly find that a juvenile is less
deserving of punishment later than he was at the time of sentencing. And as to culpability in wrongdoing, the parole board cannot find that the offense was less grave or
that the juvenile was less at fault in terms of mens rea. Those things are fixed in history.
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who received a parole-eligible life sentence would be punished less
severely than a (more culpable) adult who received a parole-ineligible
life sentence. The parole-ineligible sentence as applied to the juvenile
would be unconstitutional while the parole-eligible one would not be,
even if the juvenile were never released.
The Court has suggested before that parole is relevant to severity.
In Solem v. Helm, the Court struck down an individual sentence of life
without parole as grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amend64
ment. In Rummel v. Estelle, it upheld a sentence of life with the possi65
bility of parole against a similar challenge. Language in both cases
made clear that “the possibility of parole, however slim, serve[d] to
66
distinguish” the one sentence from the other. Later, in Harmelin, the
Court went even further, stating that life without parole is “the second
most severe [sentence] known to the law; but life imprisonment with
67
possibility of parole is . . . the third most severe.”
Why that is so, however, is not immediately obvious. Harmelin’s
statement was a one-off. Solem and Rummel, on which Graham placed
substantial weight in its severity analysis, never analyzed the point in
depth, apparently assuming that it was more or less self-evident. Academics, in their neglect of parole, have ignored the issue almost com68
pletely.
But if severity turns on the maximum punishment an
offender might suffer—which is how the Court’s proportionality cases
69
have generally viewed the issue —then the mere availability of parole
should not affect it. This is particularly true against the backdrop of
the Court’s consistent deference to states’ discretion on parole decisions. Graham itself repeatedly insisted that the Eighth Amendment
“does not require the State to release [a juvenile] offender during his

64

463 U.S. 277, 302-03 (1983).
445 U.S. 263, 280-81, 285 (1980).
66
Id. at 281; see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 (stating that a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole is “far more severe” than a sentence of life with the possibility of
parole); cf. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280-81 (stating that a “proper assessment” of a paroleeligible life sentence “could hardly ignore the possibility that [the offender] will not
actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life”).
67
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991). The Court, however, rejected a
proportionality challenge to the life without parole sentence at issue on the ground that
categorical proportionality review did not apply outside the capital context. Id. at 994.
68
Supra note 5 notes an exception.
69
See, e.g., Ristroph, supra note 4, at 76-77 (“In nearly all of the Court’s proportionality cases to date, the severity of a prison sentence is simply a question of time—of how
long the prisoner will remain incarcerated.”).
65
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70

natural life.” It is hard to see a difference in severity between a sentence of life without parole and one of life with parole when parole
release is neither required nor guaranteed. Absent a constitutional
mandate imposing substantive conditions for release, offenders sentenced to life with parole can—and often will—still serve a life sen71
tence. It is just that the parole board, not the sentencing judge, ulti72
ultimately makes the judgment that they will do so. And it does so
slowly, by degrees, and over time.
One might respond that parole release need not be guaranteed to
affect severity. Parole eligibility by itself could be sufficient to alter the
severity calculus because, by at least increasing the possibility of re73
lease, it decreases the “expected value” of the sentence. Many other
back-end sentencing variables, however—executive clemency, disciplinary and good-time rules, even enhanced appellate rights in capital
74
cases—have the same effect. Yet none of those factors ever has been
thought to be constitutionally significant to severity for proportionality
purposes. The ever present possibility that a death sentence might be
commuted, for example, or the fact that only a small percentage of
death row inmates are actually executed, does not render a death sen75
tence any less severe under the Eighth Amendment. Nor, as the
70

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010); see also id. (“A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.”).
71
See, e.g., Frase, supra note 4, at 56 (“[D]espite [Graham’s] extended discussion . . . of the diminished culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders, it appears
that they can end up serving life without parole unless, at some point, crime control
purposes justify release—their diminished culpability and other retributive values based
on the original offense impose no upper limit on prison time served.”); Ristroph, supra
note 4, at 77 (noting Graham’s lack of any guarantee of release).
72
Of course, there may be other, non-proportionality-based reasons to commit the
decision on life imprisonment to the parole board ex post instead of the sentencing
judge ex ante. See infra Part II & Section III.A.
73
In its most basic form, the expected value of a sentence is the sentence imposed
multiplied by the probability that it will be served. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (developing the
basic economic model of deterrence). The expected value of a life sentence without
parole would be Life x 1.00; the expected value of a life sentence with a one percent
chance of receiving parole would be Life x 0.99. All else being equal, the latter is less
than the former.
74
E.g., LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ-153858,
PRISON SENTENCES AND TIME SERVED FOR VIOLENCE 1-2 (1995), available at http://
bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/PSATSFV.PDF.
75
See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1846-60 (2000) (documenting high attrition rates of
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Court made clear in both Graham and Solem, does the possibility of
76
While Graham and Solem atclemency alter the severity calculus.
tempted to distinguish clemency from parole on grounds of clemen77
78
cy’s alleged remoteness, that claim is of dubious empirical validity,
particularly given the broad authority to deny parole that Graham
79
claimed to have left intact. More to the point, trying to separate parole from other back-end variables based on the remoteness or likelihood of relief does not solve the conceptual problem. Any differences,
80
to the extent they exist, are merely differences of degree, not kind.
At a minimum, this approach would still suggest that capital sentences
81
in states with standing moratoriums on executions (like Oregon and,
82
before it repealed the death penalty altogether, Illinois ) should not
be considered as severe as those in states that have high execution
capital sentences); Ristroph, supra note 4, at 77 n.14 (noting that after Daryl Atkins’s
successful Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge, he was again sentenced to
death, but that his death sentence was later commuted).
76
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (“[T]he remote possibility of
[executive clemency] does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.” (citation omitted)); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 302-03 (1983) (rejecting the argument that the
possibility of executive clemency altered the severity of a sentence of life without parole); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (characterizing life without parole as the “second most severe [sentence] known to the law” while
acknowledging that it preserved “the possibilities of retroactive legislative reduction
and executive clemency” as “flexible techniques for later reducing [a] sentence” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027; Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-01.
78
For example, in California,
[j]ust six parole-eligible murderers out of several thousand eligible were
granted parole release during the tenure of Governor Gray Davis; . . . each
year the parole board finds only three percent of parole-eligible prisoners serving life sentences suitable for release, and only one percent are actually released after review by the full parole board and the governor.
Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 396 (footnotes omitted).
79
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
80
Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1167-73 (2009) (describing ways in which death and terms-of-years sentences are similar in severity and
concluding that the differences that do exist do not justify widely disparate treatments
under the Eighth Amendment).
81
See Jonathan J. Cooper, Ore. Governor Bans Death Penalty for Rest of Term, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/23/oregovernor-bans-death-penalty-rest-term (reporting on Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber’s
decision to issue a reprieve to any prisoner facing execution).
82
See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Improving Criminal Justice: How Can We
Make the American Criminal Justice System More Just?, 95 JUDICATURE 59, 59 (2011) (“In Illinois, . . . shocking revelations about innocent men on death row led first to a moratorium
on executions, and eventually to the abolition of capital punishment altogether.”).
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83

rates (like Virginia, Texas, and Oklahoma ). For parole to affect severity in an “expected value” sense would thus profoundly alter proportionality analysis as we know it.
Graham’s remaining answer to the severity question—that life
84
without parole works “a forfeiture that is irrevocable” —is just as unsatisfying. If “irrevocable” means that no parole board exists to order
early release, we run into the same problems just mentioned: in the
absence of some substantive criteria for how a board must exercise its
discretion, the existence of a parole board does not guarantee shorter
sentences, and it is unclear how the possibility of a shorter sentence
affects severity in any event. If “irrevocable” means that the punishment is somehow irreversible, final, or incapable of being corrected,
the point is weaker still. As Rachel Barkow and Alice Ristroph separately observe, there is no way to reverse any portion of any sentence—
be it a death sentence or a term of years—once it has already been
85
served. To the extent the ability to do so might be relevant to severity—and it is not immediately clear how it would be—irrevocability of
this sort does not distinguish death or life without parole from any
86
other sentences.
We could try to get around some of these problems by looking to
severity metrics other than sentence length. Ristroph, one of the few
scholars who has grappled with the issue, emphasizes the importance
87
of hope to severity. Graham’s severity discussion pointed out that the
83

See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 227, 238 n.49 (2012) (reporting that, from 2004 to 2009, Texas performed 134
executions, Ohio performed 25, and Oklahoma performed 22).
84
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
85
See Barkow, supra note 80, at 1174; Ristroph, supra note 4, at 75. Of course, the
State could apologize and compensate or make other reparative efforts, but the time
served is lost forever. Cf. Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the
Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
407, 468 & n.258 (2005).
86
Offenders serving life without parole have the same rights and abilities as any
other offender to raise post-conviction challenges. See generally BRIAN R. MEANS, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 1:1, 12:1, 12:9 (2011 ed.) (reviewing postconviction remedies
applicable to all offenders); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 28.128.7, at 1333-78 (5th ed. 2009) (same).
87
See Ristroph, supra note 4. Outside of the Eighth Amendment context, Adam
Kolber and other punishment theorists have recently debated whether and how much
just punishment must take into account an offender’s subjective experience. See infra
note 95. The debate is important, but it does not affect my basic point here, which is
that any degree-based, subjective approach to assessing punishment severity would significantly alter conventional Eighth Amendment principles.
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denial of parole means the denial of all “hope of restoration,” regard88
less of an offender’s transformation while in prison. If severity turns
not just on sentence length but also on the degree of suffering while
incarcerated, then one might argue that a sentence of “life with hopelessness” is more severe than one of “life with hope”—at least if we
assume that hope repeatedly dashed is better than hope denied at the
89
outset. As Ristroph explains, “An offender who is sentenced at 16
and incarcerated continuously, without parole review, until his death
at 70 is punished more severely than a second offender who is sentenced at 16, granted multiple opportunities for parole review, and
90
According to
consistently denied parole until his death at 70.”
Ristroph, “[t]he first offender is denied hope, whereas the second os91
tensibly is not.”
Here too, though, we run into difficulties. First, many legal
sources of hope exist for prisoners, including gubernatorial pardons,
good-time credits, probation rules, and prison regulations about visita92
tions from family and friends. Should the varying availability of such
devices among states and localities also factor into the severity calculus? Second, if hope matters because it affects offenders’ experience
of punishment, then, as Ristroph suggests, should not “solitary confinement, security classifications, and other dimensions of prison conditions that render a sentence more severe without necessarily
extending its duration” also be appropriate proportionality considera93
tions? Or, third, is the real significance of hope not in its relation88

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027; see also id. (noting that life without parole “‘means
denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial;
it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the
convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Naovarath v. Nevada, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989))); id. at 2032 (“Life in
prison without the possibility of parole gives . . . no hope.”).
89
This may well be a questionable assumption. See William Ruddick, Hope and Deception, 13 BIOETHICS 343, 346-47 (1999) (“We cannot assume that ‘it is better to have
hoped and lost than never to have hoped at all.’”).
90
Ristroph, supra note 4, at 77.
91
Id.
92
Prisoners might also have illegal or extralegal sources of hope, such as hope of
escape or hope of religious redemption.
93
See id.; see also DUFF, supra note 52, at 136-37 (noting difficulties with ranking
severity of punishments); Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions
of Confinement Litigation Benefit From Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 7679 (2009) (arguing that proportionality principles should apply to conditions of confinement); Ristroph, supra note 39, at 276 n.45 (flagging the “weakness in any proportionality analysis that looks only at the length of a prison term”). It seems intuitively
correct that severity cannot be measured solely in terms of years spent in prison. The
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ship to suffering per se, but in the specific object of the hope that accompanies parole—restoration, reconciliation, reintegration? Perhaps
it is not the length of the sentence, nor the suffering imposed, but the
permanent exclusion of an offender as hopelessly outside the moral
community, or the categorical denial of any chance to redeem one94
self, that tips the severity balance. But notice how far we have now
come from a truly substantive notion of severity: severity now rises
and falls with the creation of procedural spaces and opportunities.
Like release, redemption might still be denied. It just will be denied
over time.
Exactly what counts toward punishment severity under the Eighth
Amendment is undertheorized, and the field could benefit from more
95
attention to questions of this sort. The point here is not to show
ultimate severity of capital punishment—which brutally shortens the actual length of
incarceration—makes that clear. John Stuart Mill put the point this way:
What comparison can there really be, in point of severity, between consigning
a man to the short pang of a rapid death, and immuring him in a living tomb,
there to linger out what may be a long life in the hardest and most monotonous toil, without any of its alleviation or rewards—debarred from all pleasant
sights and sounds, and cut off from all earthly hope, except a slight mitigation
of bodily restraint, or a small improvement of diet?
21 Apr. 1868, PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1868) 1047 (U.K.)., reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 271, 272-73 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed. 1972).
94

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (observing that life without
parole denies any “chance for reconciliation with society”); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding unconstitutional a sentence of denationalization for military desertion as “cruel and unusual”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366
(1910) (holding unconstitutionally “cruel and unusual” a sentence of fifteen years plus
cadena temporal because, among other considerations, it took from the offender the
hope of seeking “to retrieve his fall from rectitude”); Smith & Cohen, supra note 4, at
92 (“Graham’s most significant role may be in its recognition of redemption as an
Eighth Amendment constitutional principle.”).
95
For instance, does a negative retributivist vision of the Eighth Amendment require a strictly retributive metric for assessing punishment severity? If so, what is such a
metric? Although theorists have touched on these questions in the past, sustained examination of them has been lacking, especially as they relate to the Court’s proportionality jurisprudence. The one notable exception in contemporary punishment
theory is the recent debate involving John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, Chad
Flanders, Adam Kolber, Dan Markel, and Jonathan Masur over the extent to which we
should take into account offenders’ subjective experiences when assessing punishment,
including whether such experiences are relevant to retributive punishment at all. See
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan
Masur, Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1463 (2010); Adam
J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565 (2009); Adam J.
Kolber, Essay, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009);
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definitively that parole has no constitutional significance for severity or
any other aspect of substantive proportionality law. Rather, the aim is
to illustrate how much we have to twist and bend conventional proportionality concepts to make parole relevant.
II. PAROLE AND PROCEDURE
Many of the problems described above stem from a confluence of
substance and procedure. Because parole guarantees no substantive
outcomes, injecting parole into sentencing does not prohibit actual
punishment. Instead, it provides a procedural mechanism for finetuning sentences on a case-by-case basis over time. In that sense, parole’s Eighth Amendment significance is at least as much structural
and systemic as it is substantive. Part I showed how parole’s procedural
dimension makes it difficult to fit into a substantive proportionality
box and, implicitly, how attempting to do so obscures parole’s procedural side. This Part focuses more squarely on parole’s procedural
aspects and offers an understanding of its constitutional significance as
rooted in concerns about reliability and individualized sentencing.
Although Graham cast its doctrinal position in substantive terms, it
is closer to a rule of constitutional criminal procedure. Graham hinged
the constitutionality of punishment on what is essentially a procedural
condition. The most severe punishment for juvenile offenders—life in
prison—can still be imposed, but only if it is accompanied by the procedural protection of parole. Parole thus conceptually severs Graham
from Roper, Atkins, and other classic proportionality cases on which it
96
relied for much of its doctrinal support. Despite their obvious similarities, none of those cases linked the constitutionality of punishment

Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907 (2010). For earlier scholarly forays into the issue,
see, for example, DUFF, supra note 52, at 136-37, ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND
SANCTIONS 34-35 (1993), NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 106-10 (1991), Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment, and the Impact of Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 251, 254-61 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds.,
1998), and Michael Tonry, Proportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangeability of Punishments, in PENAL THEORY AND PRACTICE: TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 59, 73 (Anthony Duff et al. eds., 1994).
96
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death
penalty for a nonhomicide crime committed against an adult); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of an adult).
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97

to a procedural rule. When it came to punishment, those cases drew
hard and fast substantive lines.
Graham, in contrast, did not. Graham mandated a granular, textured, and open-ended sentencing inquiry for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders. That inquiry muddles together substantive justifications for
punishment with procedural checks and balances on the sentencing
98
process. Substantive considerations still matter: “maturity,” “incorri99
100
101
gibility,” “capacity for change,” “depravity,” and other offender
characteristics will continue to inform the sentencing determination.
But the point is not to foreclose any one sentencing outcome at the
outset based on those considerations, but to tailor and individualize
punishment by spreading the exercise of sentencing discretion over
time and to a larger pool of decisionmakers. After Graham, a juvenile
can still grow old and die in prison, but he must receive repeated and
closer sentencing looks before doing so.
Graham is not the first time the Court has hinged the constitutionality of a punishment on this type of procedural rule. The Court’s
seminal line of cases requiring individualized capital sentencing determinations took a similar proceduralist approach. Beginning with
Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court invoked the Eighth Amendment
to strike down various state capital sentencing schemes that prevented
sentencers from engaging in a “particularized consideration” of the
102
offender and the offense. Woodson involved a mandatory death penalty statute that required imposition of the death penalty upon convic103
tion for first-degree murder. But the cases it spawned quickly came
to stand for the more general proposition that, as the Court explained
in Lockett v. Ohio, the sentencer must not be precluded from consider97

For example, no amount of additional procedure would have rendered the execution of juveniles lawful in Roper. See 543 U.S. 551, 568-69 (2005). The same holds
true for the executions at issue in Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421, Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002), Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801, and Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. See generally Steiker, supra
note 36, at 298 (observing that Roper and Atkins created “substantive limitations” on
executions of juveniles and the mentally retarded).
98
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
99
Id. at 2054.
100
Id. at 2030.
101
Id. at 2054.
102
428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion).
103
See id. at 286 (“A murder which shall be perpetrated by . . . any . . . willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate any . . . felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be
punished with death.” (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975))).
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ing as a mitigating factor “any of the circumstances of the offense” or
104
Together, Wood“any aspect of a defendant’s character or record.”
son and Lockett constitutionalized a requirement of textured and granular sentencing in capital cases.
The Court has applied the
Woodson/Lockett principle over the years to invalidate state schemes
that prohibited consideration of a wide range of factors in sentencing,
105
including an offender’s social and financial poverty, abuse as a
106
107
child, mental impairment caused by inhaling gasoline, retarda108
109
110
111
tion, borderline IQ, youth, model behavior as a pretrial detainee,
112
and status as a “fond and affectionate uncle.”
Graham did not explicitly rely on Woodson and Lockett, and commentators, focused on substantive proportionality doctrine, have overlooked the connection. But the parallel is worth exploring because it
helps illuminate the procedural side of parole’s constitutional significance in the decision. As with Graham, it is hard to tie the particulars
of the Woodson/Lockett principle to a strictly retributivist Eighth
Amendment limitation on punishment. The factors relevant to the
Woodson/Lockett line of cases mirror those relevant to parole with their
broad and diverse mix of backward- and forward-looking, retributivist
and consequentialist considerations. Some of those factors relate to
113
114
future dangerousness. Some concern responsibility for the offense.

104

438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (“[I]n capital cases ‘the sentencer . . . [may] not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.’” (second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982))). The statute struck down in
Lockett, while not a mandatory death penalty statute, restricted the capital sentencer’s
consideration of mitigating circumstances to only three specified factors. See 438 U.S.
at 607 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1975)).
105
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987).
106
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16.
107
Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 397.
108
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
109
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1990).
110
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 370 (1988).
111
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 14 (1986).
112
Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 397. See generally Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth
Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 804-07 (1998)
(discussing cases applying the Woodson/Lockett individualization rule).
113
See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82 (1987) (requiring consideration of
evidence of offender’s ability to control violent behavior); Skipper, 476 U.S. at 6-7 (requiring consideration of evidence of offender’s ability to adapt to prison life).
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Some concern capacity for rehabilitation or potential to contribute to
115
116
Some reference general good character or moral merit.
society.
But all are part of the mitigation inquiry. As Carol and Jordan Steiker
and others observe, the Woodson/Lockett principle suggests that “there
is no substantive limitation at all on a defendant’s ability to present” or
the sentencer’s discretion to consider mitigating factors when making
an individualized determination of whether to impose a death sen117
Indeed, as Scott Howe notes, the Court has implied that
tence.
where mitigating evidence may be relevant to more than one purpose
of punishment, the sentencer must be free to consider its impact on
118
any of the purposes to which it might relate.
While the Court’s failure to articulate a penological theory for the
119
individualization requirement has troubled some commentators, the
114

See, e.g., Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1357-58 (10th Cir. 1984) (requiring
consideration of evidence of offender’s limited participation in the crime).
115
See, e.g., Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 453 n.7, 455 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring consideration of evidence of offender’s service to the community and the military); Miller v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 426, 430-31 (11th Cir. 1986) (requiring
consideration of evidence of offender’s prospects for rehabilitation), vacated sub nom.
Dugger v. Miller, 480 U.S. 901 (1987).
116
See, e.g., Coleman, 839 F.2d at 453 n.7, 455 n.8 (requiring consideration of evidence of offender’s general good character); Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433
(11th Cir. 1987) (requiring consideration of evidence of offender’s hardworking nature).
117
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 853 (1992) (reviewing
BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR (1992)); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 663 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Eighth Amendment contains no “objective criterion of what is
mitigating”); Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett
Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 301-02 (1991) (observing that Lockett’s individualization requirement “contains no reference to any particular moral theory or
theories” and instead embraces a principle of “moral neutrality”); Garvey, supra note
59, at 1011 (discussing the “laissez-faire character” of the capital sentencing mitigation
inquiry); Howe, supra note 112, at 809-10 (stating that the “individualization requirement
calls for an expansive inquiry and almost unfettered sentencer choice”).
Nor is there any clear substantive standard governing aggravating factors, which
can and often do include both retributivist and forward-looking, consequentialist considerations. See Howe, supra note 112, at 834 (noting that the Court has not “required
that aggravating circumstances focus on offender deserts as opposed to utilitarian questions” and “has not even required that capital sentencers be advised about the substantive question to be resolved at the sentencing hearing”); Steiker & Steiker, supra, at
854-55 (discussing the types and functions of aggravating circumstances that capital
sentencers consider).
118
See Howe, supra note 112, at 807 & n.49 (citing Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7).
119
See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 117, at 858; see also Garvey, supra note 59, at
1011; Howe, supra note 112, at 816-18.
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Court has never seen the particulars of that requirement as a matter of
substantive punishment theory. Woodson and Lockett were premised on
the notion that “the fundamental respect for humanity” inherent in
the Eighth Amendment required a special degree of reliability in capi120
tal sentencing. Reliability necessitated individualization because sentencers could ensure “a just and appropriate sentence” only by
“consider[ing] the character and record of the individual offender
121
and the circumstances of the particular offense.” Individualization,
in turn, required that the sentencer have unfettered choice to consider virtually any mitigating factor offered by the offender. This granular approach to sentencing provided a “greater degree of reliability” by
minimizing the “risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
122
factors which may call for a less severe penalty.”
123
The “fundamental weakness”
of the mandatory sentencing
schemes that the Woodson Court struck down was their “inability to reliably determine that death was the morally appropriate sentence” in
124
Legislatures, the Court recognized, were ill equipped to
each case.
individualize ex ante through statute. Exhaustively specifying a definitive, closed, and preweighed set of statutory factors for when death
should be imposed was impossible and frustrated the fine-grained,
particularized inquiry that was a “constitutionally indispensable part of
125
Legislatures could
the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”
120

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 304.
122
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also Monge
v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998) (“Because the death penalty is unique ‘in both
its severity and its finality,’ we have recognized an acute need for reliability in capital
sentencing proceedings.” (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977)));
Butler v. South Carolina, 459 U.S. 932, 933 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“Recognizing the extraordinary consequences of the capital sentencing
process, this Court has stressed ‘the need for reliability in the determination that death
is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’ Accordingly, ‘we have invalidated
procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination.’” (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638
(1980))); Bilionis, supra note 117, at 321 (“Lockett is concerned with the ‘unacceptable
risk’ that the sentencer’s inability or refusal to consider and give effect to mitigating
evidence might have affected the reliability of its moral judgment.”); Howe, supra note
112, at 818 (“The argument in favor of the broad individualization mandate is that
sentencers have the opportunity to consider much more information about the offender . . . and that this additional information will lead them to make better judgments.”).
123
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291.
124
Bilionis, supra note 117, at 290.
125
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304; see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976)
(“The futility of attempting to solve the problems of mandatory death penalty statutes
by narrowing . . . the capital offense stems from [the] rejection of the belief that ‘every
121
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still make initial sentencing judgments by laying out categories of
crimes and aggravating factors that rendered defendants “deatheligible”; indeed, to protect against the wholly arbitrary and incon126
sistent administration of the death penalty, Furman v. Georgia and its
127
But distrust of legislaprogeny effectively required that they do so.
tures’ ultimate competence to articulate reliable sentencing judgments
in advance—whether through mandatory death-penalty statutes or
otherwise—required the final decision on punishment to lie in the
hands of the sentencer, who was best positioned to evaluate “the
128
diverse frailties of humankind.”

offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the
past life and habits of a particular offender.’” (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949))); Bilionis, supra note 117, at 294 (“As Woodson acknowledged, society’s
rejection of mandatory death penalty statutes manifests an unwillingness to entrust the
legislatures with the task of formulating a definitive and close-ended moral calculus for
choosing between life and death.”); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 305, 308 (“[A] judge or jury’s decision to kill is an intensely moral, subjective matter that seems to defy the designers of general formulas for legal decision.”).
As the second Justice Harlan famously expressed the point in McGautha v. California:
Those who have come to grips with the hard task of actually attempting to
draft means of channeling capital sentencing discretion have confirmed the
lesson taught by . . . history . . . . To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly
understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which
are beyond present human ability.
402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).
126
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
127
See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (“[Gregg] requires a State to ‘channel the sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and
detailed guidance and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.’” (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980))); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (“[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate
information and guidance.”). See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361-64, 375-78 (1995) (tracing the evolution of Eighth
Amendment capital sentencing requirements aimed at promoting consistency).
128
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14
(1982) (holding that courts cannot prevent capital sentencers from considering “any
relevant mitigating evidence”). Numerous commentators and several Justices have
noted the tension between Furman’s mandate of consistency and nonarbitrariness and
Woodson’s mandate of individualization. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 59, at 1001 nn.4849 (collecting articles and cases that illustrate the uneasy relationship between consistency and individualization); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 127 (reviewing develop-
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Similar concerns permeate Graham. The opinion is rife with references to risks that sentencing judgments underlying juvenile life without parole might be inaccurate, untrustworthy, or otherwise
129
As in the capital context, some of those risks stem
questionable.
from institutional breakdowns in the sentencing process. As the process unfolds, the institutions that channel juveniles toward a sentence
of life without parole do little reliably to capture only the worst juvenile offenders, either because of failures in discretion or inherent limits
of institutional competence. At the beginning of the process, legislatures bump up against the same problems just discussed. Statutes authorizing life without parole paint only in the broadest strokes.
Offenders are generally eligible if they have committed very serious
crimes, or are substantial recidivists, or some combination of both; stat130
utes usually make no attempt to tailor beyond such broad categories.
A number of jurisdictions even make life without parole mandatory for
131
132
certain serious crimes, a practice that Harmelin explicitly upheld.
Many legislatures, moreover, may not have fully appreciated the
consequences for juveniles when they set up these schemes. Most statutes authorizing punishments of life without parole are general sentencing statutes that apply to criminal prosecutions of adult offenders;

ment of and tensions within constitutional capital punishment doctrine). I do not
wade into that issue here.
129
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (discussing juveniles’
transient characters and the difficulty that even experts have distinguishing the “irreparabl[y] corrupt[]” from the merely “unfortunate” juveniles (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 2029 (observing that juveniles’ characteristics make
judgments of incorrigibility “questionable”).
130
See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101(c) (West 2002) (“[O]n conviction
for a fourth time of a crime of violence, a person who has served three separate terms
of confinement in a correctional facility as a result of three separate convictions of any
crime of violence shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.570 (West 2010) (“Notwithstanding the statutory
maximum sentence or any other provision of this chapter, a persistent offender shall be
sentenced to a term of total confinement for life without the possibility of release . . . .”).
131
See ASHLEY NELLIS & R YAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 31 (2009) (“[T]here are no sentencing
options available to judges [of juveniles in criminal courts]; mandatory life sentences
are required for certain crimes through state statute. In these cases, one’s young age or
other mitigating factors cannot be included in determining the appropriate sentence
length.”); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole
on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 691 n.40 (1998) (citing mandatory life without parole statutes).
132
The petitioner in Harmelin raised both an Eighth Amendment proportionality
challenge and a Woodson/Lockett individualization challenge. The Court rejected both.
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991).
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they do not target juveniles or juvenile proceedings.
Juveniles become subject to them only after being “waived” into adult court. Once
there, they face the same sentences that could be given to any adult
134
offender.
Historically, juvenile waiver required an individualized, case-bycase, judicial determination as an independent check on the prosecu135
tion of juveniles.
But adult prosecution of juveniles has greatly ex136
panded with the tough-on-crime movement of the last thirty years.
137
Many states now make waiver mandatory for certain crimes.
Many
also authorize prosecutorial waiver or direct charging in criminal court
133

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-16(a) (2008) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted of an offense committed after May 1,
1993 . . . may be sentenced to . . . imprisonment for life without parole . . . .”); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301(b) (2009) (“A person sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole shall not be eligible for parole and shall remain imprisoned under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections during the remainder of his life . . . .”); see also
sources cited supra note 130.
134
See NELLIS & KING, supra note 131, at 31 (“Once transferred to the adult court,
young people face the same sentencing options as adults, including the possibility of sentences to life or life without parole.”); Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of
Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 16 (2008) (“Once states convict juveniles in criminal court, judges
sentence them as if they were adults and send them to the same prisons as adults.”).
135
See, e.g., Hector Linares & Derwyn Bunton, An Open Door to the Criminal Courts:
Analyzing the Evolution of Louisiana’s System for Juvenile Waiver, 71 LA. L. REV. 191, 196
(2010) (discussing the individualized waiver standard); Melissa A. Scott, The “Critically
Important” Decision of Waiving Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Who Should Decide?, 50 LOY. L.
REV. 711, 729 (2004) (explaining that before a judge may transfer a juvenile to a criminal court, the judge must “examine the juvenile’s amenability to treatment and rehabilitation, and the danger the juvenile poses to the public” (citing LA. CHILD CODE ANN.
art. 862 (2004))).
136
See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race and the
“Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 357 (1999) (attributing the sixtyeight percent increase in judicial waivers between 1988 and 1992 mainly to tough-oncrime measures); Ellie D. Shefi, Waiving Goodbye: Incarcerating Waived Juveniles in Adult
Correctional Facilities Will Not Reduce Crime, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 653, 661 (2003)
(explaining that the “get tough” policies of the 1990s resulted in “easier means of transferring juveniles to adult court” and “expanded sentencing options”).
137
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(a) (2008) (restricting the State’s use of
juvenile delinquency proceedings to cases involving juveniles under age fifteen or juveniles under age eighteen whose conduct would have constituted a misdemeanor if
committed by an adult); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vii) (providing exclusive jurisdiction in criminal court over children ages thirteen to seventeen who are
alleged to have committed certain serious felonies). See generally Martha June Rossiter,
Comment, Transferring Children to Adult Criminal Court: How to Best Protect Our Children
and Society, 27 J. JUV. L. 123, 126, 128-31 (2006) (reviewing and critiquing mandatory
waiver laws).
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in certain circumstances—powers that, far from being used sparingly,
are routinely exercised as plea-bargaining chips by prosecutors seeking
138
maximum leverage. The end result of this patchwork of harsh adult
sentencing statutes and liberal waiver rules is that, as Graham stated,
“eligibility of a juvenile offender for life without parole does not indicate that the penalty has been endorsed through deliberate, express,
139
and full legislative consideration.”
Once the juvenile is in the criminal pipeline, an additional source
of sentencing risk becomes an issue: risk that flows from the unique
characteristics of juveniles. Some of those characteristics—impulsiveness, mistrust of authority, and poor long-term decisionmaking—
create special difficulties for juvenile representation and increase “the
risk that . . . a court or jury will erroneously conclude that a particular
140
juvenile is sufficiently culpable to deserve life without parole . . . .”

138

See Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be
Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment,
37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 806 (2000) (observing that “the state can use the potential
for transfer and the ability to appeal transfer decisions as a bargaining chip”); Lisa A.
Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to
Adult Criminal Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254, 1267 (1996) (discussing the incentives of
even innocent juveniles to take pleas that will keep them in juvenile court); see also
Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 249 (Del. 1994) (stating that prosecutorial waiver
“strip[s] the judiciary of its independent jurisdictional role in the adjudication of children”); cf. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1660 (2010) (“[D]eference to perceived prosecutorial supremacy is defensible only if, all else equal, the prosecutor is most competent
institutionally to exercise equitable discretion. At least when it comes to certain charging decisions, this is far from clear.”).
139
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988) (observing that state legislatures’ authorization of waiver
for a particular crime “tells us nothing about the judgment these States have made
regarding the appropriate punishment for . . . youthful offenders” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 850 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that when a
legislature allows juveniles to be processed through the adult criminal justice system “it
does not necessarily follow that the legislature[] . . . deliberately concluded that it
would be appropriate to impose capital punishment on [juveniles]”); Logan, supra note
131, at 718, 720 (noting “the possibly unanticipated interplay” of waiver and mandatory
punishment statutes “often contained in disparate sections of a State’s statute books”
and observing that “it is unclear whether legislators comprehend the actual consequences of their radical measures to overhaul criminal justice”); id. at 721 (concluding
that “there is scant reason to believe that waiver, in whatever form, serves to winnow in
any reliable way only those juveniles that should be prosecuted as adults”); Katherine
Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children to Criminal Court in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 447, 484 (noting that waiver is often based upon “bureaucratic rather than individuated concerns which preclude an assessment of the minor’s
blameworthiness”).
140
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
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Others frustrate the very nature of the sentencing inquiry. Graham repeatedly stressed that juveniles’ plasticity and capacity for change makes
judgments of incorrigibility at the time of sentencing especially sus141
pect. With juveniles in particular, we can never be fully confident that
they are as bad, corrupt, depraved, or irredeemable as we might think in
the short time after they have committed a serious crime.
The structure of sentencing exacerbates these problems. The oneshot nature of the process means that the most important judgments
are front-loaded to the time of sentencing. The pressures described
above feed into a system that then attempts to judge the most malleable offenders at a single point in time, without—to use Graham’s
words—the “corroborat[ion]” of, say, later “prison misbehavior,” “fail142
ure to mature,” or any of numerous other factors that might help to
143
reveal a juvenile’s “true character.” Indeed, Graham rested the need
for a categorical rule on the inability of front-end sentencers—
including reviewing courts applying a case-by-case proportionality
analysis—to distinguish “with sufficient accuracy” the truly “incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for
144
Properly understood, this language does not refer to the
change.”
difference between case-by-case and categorical judgments per se; parole boards, after all, also make case-by-case judgments. Instead, it is
about the inability to determine an individual juvenile offender’s true
nature at T1 without some notion of what characteristics he will exhibit
long after, at T2. When it comes to juveniles, in short, there are special
reasons to doubt the trustworthiness of the moral judgments made at
145
sentencing.

141

Id. at 2029-30; see also NELLIS & KING, supra note 131, at 32 (“A review of juvenile
life without parole cases contradicts the general assumption that these sentences are
reserved only for the most chronically violent youth, ‘the worst of the worst.’” (citing
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD
OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
sites/default/files/pdfs/therestoftheirlives.pdf)); Logan, supra note 131, at 716 (“[I]t is
increasingly evident that the justice system has a highly uneven capacity to accurately
assess juvenile competency, both for fitness to stand trial and punishment . . . .”).
142
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
143
Id. at 2033.
144
Id. at 2032.
145
As Graham implied, this is even more true where the sentencing occurs relatively
close in time to the commission of an especially heinous crime, before emotions have
had a chance to cool. See id. at 2032 (noting the “unacceptable likelihood” that a heinous crime could overpower the mitigating aspects of youth (citing Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005))).
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These reliability and individualization concerns stand in contrast
to those of typical proportionality cases, which look to substantive concepts like culpability and severity to flatly prohibit punishment at the
146
In the end, Graham eschewed any straightforward approach
outset.
to substance. The Court did not limit its uneasiness with juvenile sentencing to any single substantive metric. Errors in assessing future
dangerousness, moral culpability, the potential for rehabilitation, and
147
Nor did
incentives for compliance all contributed to the decision.
the Court limit which sentencing considerations might carry significance decades after sentencing at a parole hearing. It assumed that
amorphous notions like depravity, irredeemability, incorrigibility, and
character surely would carry weight. Even the “demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation” that the Court mentioned as a substantive guidepost for future parole inquiries does not narrow the universe of possi148
ble factors to be considered. How does one measure “maturity” and
“rehabilitation,” exactly? Very likely, a parole board attempting to do
so would look at some mushy, underdefined combination of many of
the things just mentioned: evidence of depravity, irredeemability, in149
corrigibility, and other aspects of a juvenile’s “true character.” These
traits cannot easily be tied to one clean substantive vision of punishment, and the Court did not try to do so.
Graham’s response to the reliability problem instead took the form
of a procedural sentencing rule. But Graham’s rule was a twist on the
rule established in Woodson and Lockett. Woodson and Lockett pursued
fine-grainedness by diversifying sentencing across mitigating consider150
ations.
Graham did so by diversifying sentencing across time and
institutions. At least in theory, Graham could have taken the Woodson/
Lockett approach. Doing so would have required for juvenile lifewithout-parole determinations the same individualized, holistic, and
146

See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029 (noting inherent difficulties in accurately determining whether a juvenile is “incorrigible,” and observing that despite Graham’s “escalating pattern of criminal conduct, . . . it does not follow that he would be a risk to
society for the rest of his life” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
id. at 2031 (discussing “the possibility that the offender will receive a life without parole
sentence for which he or she lacks the moral culpability”); id. at 2032 (discussing the effect of life without parole on a juvenile’s “incentive to become a responsible individual”).
148
Id. at 2030.
149
See, e.g., Chanenson, The Next Era, supra note 6, at 450 & n.312 (2005) (observing
that even when explicit criteria and principles exist to guide parole boards’ release
determinations, their process is opaque, and the precise weight given to each factor is
unclear).
150
See supra notes 102-12, 120-22 and accompanying text.
147
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case-by-case mitigation inquiry that is now de rigueur in capital cases,
151
The merits (or
but is still haphazard at best in juvenile sentencing.
demerits) of the Court’s approach to capital sentencing, of course, are
152
a subject of much debate. More to the point, it is not clear that better-focused attempts at front-end individualization would do much
good in the case of juveniles. If the reliability problem stems in crucial
part from the fact that it is too hard to know a juvenile’s true nature at
the time of sentencing, loading more factors into the front-end sen153
tencing inquiry will not necessarily solve the problem. What is needed is temporal individualization, a reassessment with the benefit of
154
hindsight in the form of a constitutional “second look.”
To be clear, none of this is to say that Graham and Woodson/Lockett
have nothing to do with substantive proportionality concerns. On the
most basic level, they clearly do. Woodson/Lockett was not simply about
avoiding mistakes in sentencing. It was about avoiding mistakes in
capital sentencing—mistakes in assessing who is the worst of the worst
and therefore should be subject to the most severe penalty known to
law. The principle that the death penalty must be restricted to only
the worst of the worst offenders, which the opinions in Furman v. Geor155
gia first embraced, is clearly a substantive proportionality principle.

151

See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 4, at 82 (stating that courts have been “remarkably deferential” to states’ decisions about the extent to which sentencers must consider
“youth as a mitigating factor in the sentencing of juveniles”).
Chief Justice Roberts argued for a similar approach in his concurrence in the
judgment. But, instead of creating a new rule in the Woodson/Lockett vein, the Chief
Justice would have folded the mitigation inquiry into Harmelin’s gross disproportionality
test for noncapital cases, leaving to reviewing courts’ discretion exactly how to consider
a juvenile’s particular mitigating circumstances in each case. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2040-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also Barkow, supra note 4, at 5152 (analyzing the Chief Justice’s approach).
152
See supra note 95.
153
Constitutionalizing a right to the presentation of mitigating circumstances for
life without parole also would have required the Court to overrule its decision in Harmelin, or at least explicitly to restrict it to adult offenders.
154
See, e.g., Douglas Berman, Afternoon Keynote Address, Encouraging (and Even
Requiring) Prosecutors to Be Second-Look Sentencers, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 429,
437-38 (2010) (discussing second-look sentencing).
155
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242, 249-52 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); see
also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (“[C]apital punishment must ‘be
limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes’
and whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.” (quoting
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005))); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206

Bierschbach FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

1778

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

5/15/2012 11:34 AM

[Vol. 160: 1745

Woodson/Lockett and the Court’s other “super due process for death”
cases laid out the procedures necessary to implement that principle
156
reliably and accurately.
Graham might be reconceptualized in this way, as having both a
substantive and a procedural side. Graham’s substantive side rests on
the proportionality principle that a life sentence—after Roper, now the
most severe penalty available for juvenile offenders—must be restricted to only those truly deserving, worst of the worst juveniles. Graham’s
procedural side establishes the first broad contours of the constitutional procedures necessary to make that individualized, morally reliable assessment. In doing so, it recognizes that, in light of the unique
difficulties and uncertainties associated with sentencing juveniles, we
cannot act with confidence until after some time has passed.
III. PAROLE AND THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING REGULATION
Recognizing parole’s procedural significance does not provide a
neat and tidy answer to every question that Graham raises. But, by
providing an alternative interpretive lens through which to view the
decision, it does draw into focus some of the less obvious ways in which
Graham fits within the constitutional landscape of sentencing. This
Part explores three ways in which Graham’s treatment of parole might
broadly be seen as contributing to or heralding shifts in the future of
constitutional sentencing regulation. Section III.A explains how
Graham continues Apprendi’s project of linking considerations of institutional design to punishment legitimacy by reallocating sentencing
authority between institutional actors. Section III.B emphasizes how
Graham’s stretching out of the sentencing process breaks down traditional divides that separate front- from back-end sentencing and procedure from substance within sentencing, and broadens the
substantive values that matter to sentencing itself. Finally, Section
III.C suggests how Graham’s approach to parole could lay the foundation for the increased importance of sentencing explanations as a
means of allowing reviewing courts to police back-end sentencing
without drawing any hard substantive lines.

(2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he death penalty must be reserved for the ‘worst of
the worst.’”(citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 568)).
156
See Lee, supra note 50, at 678, 679 & n.6 (discussing “super due process for
death” cases); supra note 122.
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A. Linking Checks and Balances to Punishment Legitimacy
Graham’s treatment of parole effectively extended the Woodson/Lockett individualization principle beyond the capital punishment
context for the first time. But it also continued a more recent trend in
the Court’s sentencing jurisprudence of tying considerations of institutional design to punishment legitimacy. That trend began with Apprendi
v. New Jersey’s linkage of Sixth Amendment jury rights to substantive
157
crime definitions. Ring v. Arizona extended Apprendi to the sentenc158
159
ing phase in capital trials; Blakely v. Washington and United States v.
160
Graham approached the inBooker applied it to guidelines regimes.
stitutional issue from the other end and from a different constitutional
provision, linking the Eighth Amendment’s protection against “cruel
161
and unusual punishments” to a constitutional requirement of backend sentencing review. Whereas Apprendi shifted authority from judg162
es to juries at the front end of the process, Graham shifted authority
from actors at the front end—be they legislatures, prosecutors, judges,
or juries—to parole boards at the back end.
Notably, Graham never stated why, or even if, the second look it
required must come from a parole board. This is a question worth
asking. The Eighth Amendment’s text, unlike that of the Sixth, leaves
163
the issue wide open.
If the goal is more textured, individualized,
and morally reliable sentences, one must ask why the parole board rather than some other potential back-end sentencer—a judge, jury, ex164
ecutive, even prosecutor—gets the final call. Explicitly shifting back-

157

See 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
159
542 U.S. 296, 303-05 (2004).
160
543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005).
161
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
162
At least, that is, in cases going to trial. In the over ninety percent of criminal
cases that are resolved through plea bargaining, Apprendi still shifts power, but the shift
is not from judges to juries, but from judges to prosecutors (and, to a lesser extent,
legislatures). See Bibas, supra, note 7, at 465, 470-74.
163
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”), with id. amend. VIII (“Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
164
See, e.g., Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 407-10 (arguing for an increased
role for juries in parole decisionmaking); Berman, supra note 154, at 437-38 (proposing
that prosecutors be more directly involved in parole board decisionmaking); Joanna M.
Huang, Note, Correcting Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of Executive Clemency,
158
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end sentencing authority to any one of those bodies, of course, would
have required substantial innovation. Parole avoids those difficulties,
and Graham may well have seized upon parole mainly because it is the
most established and regularized mechanism for back-end sentencing
that currently exists.
Apprendi, however, suggests a potentially deeper motivation. Apprendi’s shift of power from judges to juries sought to further important
separation of powers values by ensuring that juries could check prose165
cutors’ and judges’ punishment decisions. Juries are well positioned
to do so because of their ability to inject “contemporary community
166
values” into punishment decisions. As Justice Stevens—the author of
the majority opinion in Apprendi—explained in Spaziano v. Florida, because juries “more accurately reflect the conscience of the community
167
than can a single judge,” they are especially suited to making the textured, granular, and fundamentally normative judgments that give
168
punishment decisions their “moral and constitutional legitimacy.”
Parole, at least in theory, performs a similar function. Like the jury in Apprendi, parole injects an additional check into the sentencing
process by fragmenting authority among different institutional actors.
It does so through an institution that historically has engaged in the
textured, granular, and individualized inquiry that true sentencing
169
reliability requires.
Relying on parole rather than, for instance, a

60 DUKE L.J. 131, 152-57 (2010) (arguing for an increased role for judges in correcting
unduly harsh sentences through executive clemency).
165
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1129 (2011) (observing that Apprendi’s
vision of juries as a check on judges and prosecutors was one of “strict, static separation
of powers”); Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, the Offense of Conviction, and the Limited Role of Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 896-902 (2004) (explaining Apprendi by reference to the institutional balance of power established in
constitutional criminal procedure).
166
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968).
167
468 U.S. 447, 487 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168
Id. at 483; see also Appleman, supra note 6, at 1311-21 (reviewing the link between the jury’s role as conscience of the community and punishment legitimacy in the
Apprendi line of cases); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 943, 1033-34 (2000) (noting the role of the jury in ensuring fine-grained
moral judgments); Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 437, 454 (2005) (same); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice,
89 VA. L. REV. 311, 382 (2003) (arguing that “[b]ecause of its ability to render individualized judgments and to reconcile conflicting views through deliberation rather than
aggregation,” the jury is best suited to making democratically and morally legitimate
sentencing judgments).
169
See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
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judge-focused mechanism yields a system in which no single institution
wields too much power: legislatures make broad judgments about sentencing ex ante; prosecutors make judgments during charging and
plea bargaining; judges make more textured, retrospective judgments
during sentencing at T1; and parole boards make further retrospective
170
and individualized judgments during parole-board hearings at T2.
Parole boards ideally also reflect to at least some degree the conscience of the community, considering and filtering a range of input
171
from affected community members and stakeholders. The resulting
“moral and constitutional legitimacy” of the sentence flows both from
the individualized, granular nature of the inquiry and the ultimate
agreement among different institutional actors that comes out of the
172
process by which punishment is imposed.
Whether this picture accurately reflects current realities is another
matter. While it seems clear that the Court had some such vision of
parole and juvenile sentencing in mind, some of its assumptions about
parole seem idealistic, outdated, or naive. Many modern-day parole
boards, for instance, see their job not as the individualized, characterdriven inquiry into redemption that Graham envisioned, but as the ex173
pert, data-driven management of actuarial risk. Instead of aiming to

170

Cf. Berman, supra note 154, at 435-37 (connecting the disappearance of parole
with a decline in checks and balances on sentencing).
171
See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text; see also O’Hear, supra note 6, at
1279 n.174 (suggesting that parole boards may be at least as qualified as juries to act as
“the conscience of the community”). But see Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at
403-10 (arguing that parole boards do not have sufficient moral legitimacy to make the
normative judgments inherent in parole release decisions).
172
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). As this account suggests, Apprendi’s view of the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment thus shares a deep commonality with Woodson/Lockett’s view of the Eighth
Amendment in that both ultimately seek to ensure morally appropriate sentencing
determinations. Justice Stevens and, more recently, Justice Breyer have implicitly recognized the connection, arguing that the Eighth Amendment requires jury sentencing
in capital cases precisely because of the jury’s ability to help safeguard against the imposition of morally inappropriate sentences—the same feature that, according to Apprendi, animates the Sixth Amendment jury right. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
613-19 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S.
504, 515-26 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467-90 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173
See, e.g., Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 397-98 (discussing the role of
risk in parole board decisionmaking); Stengel, supra note 20 (reviewing factors involved in making parole release decisions); Jeremy Travis, Back-End Sentencing: A Practice in Search of a Rationale, 74 SOC. RES. 631, 640 (2007) (suggesting that, in the modern
era, parole decisions are primarily concerned with risk management).

Bierschbach FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

1782

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

5/15/2012 11:34 AM

[Vol. 160: 1745

do justice, they err on the side of denying release and protecting pub174
The extent to which parole boards echo or embody the
lic safety.
conscience of the community in making their decisions is also questionable. As David Ball notes, parole board commissioners are usually
appointed by the governor, and released parolees who reoffend “are
175
Graham will—or at
not good news for gubernatorial incumbents.”
least should—force courts and policymakers to consider potential
counterweights to these institutional pathologies. Potential solutions
could include increased and more formalized roles for victims, offenders’ families, community members, and prosecutors; the advent and use
of “parole juries”; and changes in methods of appointing, supervising,
or incentivizing parole boards, such as requiring parole boards to recommend a specified number of prisoner releases every year or explicitly to consider the net costs of imprisonment versus release when
176
Such reforms would be in keeping with
making release decisions.
the spirit of the decision, even if not required by its letter.
B. Breaking Down Sentencing Barriers
By tying the availability of parole to the legitimacy of punishment,
Graham also broke down traditional barriers within sentencing. The
most obvious is the barrier between front- and back-end sentencing.
Requiring multiple reviews during the process of sentencing means
that sentencing is no longer a one-shot, static, unitary act. It is an extended process, premised on the notion that some offenders might

174

See, e.g., Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 398 (noting parole boards’ incentives to avoid releasing prisoners); Alexandra Marks, For Prisoners, It’s a Nearly NoParole World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 10, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WLNR
1261020 (surveying parole policies across time and states and describing the difficulty
of countering political pressures against release).
175
Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 398; see also Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to Communities: Political, Economic, and Social Consequences, FED. PROBATION,
June 2001, at 3, 7 (“In most states, the chair and all members of the parole board are
appointed by the governor; in two-thirds of the states, there are no professional qualifications for parole board membership.”).
176
For an expanded discussion of some of these possibilities, see Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 406-10. See also id. at 399-400 (proposing that parole boards
consider net costs of imprisonment versus release); Berman, supra note 154, at 437
(suggesting that criminal justice officials be given quotas, forcing them to recommend
at least a small number of prisoner releases every year); Douglas A. Berman, A Truly
(and Peculiarly) American “Revolution in Punishment Theory,” 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1120
(2010–2011) (discussing how parole juries could bring laypersons’ sense of justice to
parole release decisions); Petersilia, supra note 175, at 7 (discussing the “need to rethink who should be responsible for making parole release decisions”).
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outgrow or otherwise evolve out of their punishments and the original
judgments that informed them. While we might be able to pass judgment on offenders with stable, well-formed characters, and to treat
those ex ante judgments as presumptively reliable ex post, the same
does not hold for juveniles and perhaps for others who have an inherent and pronounced capacity for change. Although the Court limited
its holding to life sentences for juveniles who were not convicted of
homicide, this logic could extend to juvenile life sentences for homicide and perhaps to other mandatory minimums for juvenile offenders
177
as well. Graham’s treatment of sentencing as a more holistic, drawnout process might also suggest more robust rights at the parole stage
for access to counsel, more formal hearing procedures, and other protections that routinely attach to front-end sentencing, at least where
178
punishments are sufficiently severe as to trigger Graham’s strictures.
Graham also further blurred the boundary between procedural and
substantive sentencing considerations, as well as the boundaries
among different types of substantive considerations. The Court’s coupling of procedural safeguards with substantive proportionality concerns underscored the artificiality of the substance-procedure divide
in both sentencing and Eighth Amendment theory; as Furman v.
Georgia and the Court’s other early capital punishment cases made
179
clear, the two cannot always easily be separated.
And while the
Court’s reliance on substantive proportionality law allowed it to expand existing doctrine only incrementally by hewing closely to Roper
and Atkins, its use of the procedural, back-end remedy of parole also

177

See Nilsen, supra note 4, at 69 (observing that all juvenile mandatory minimum
sentences “do not afford any discretion to the sentencer based on individual characteristics of the offender,” and so might violate Graham); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Mandatory Minimums: Don’t Give Up on the Court, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 67, 71,
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/Joomla1.5/content/denovo/OHEAR_2011_67.pdf
(“Graham may also give grounds for juveniles (and perhaps others with deeply diminished culpability, such as the mentally retarded) to challenge lesser mandatory minimums.”). The Court is currently considering two follow-on cases to Graham that present
the question whether sentencing juveniles convicted of homicide offenses to life without
parole violates the Eighth Amendment. See Jackson v. Hobbs, No. 10-9647 (U.S. argued
Mar. 20, 2012); Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646 (U.S. argued Mar. 20, 2012).
178
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 86, § 26.4 (detailing due process protections provided during the sentencing process); cf. Appleman, supra note 6, at 1368-69 (arguing
that Apprendi should apply to parole release and revocation decisions); Ball, Heinous,
Atrocious, and Cruel, supra note 6, at 961-68 (arguing that Apprendi should apply to
parole release decisions in California).
179
See supra notes 122, 155-56 and accompanying text.
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allowed it to avoid confronting and drawing lines around difficult
substantive questions. Is fifty years for juvenile nonhomicide too
long? How much weight can or should parole boards give to retributive, rehabilitative, and incapacitative considerations? Should different
considerations carry different weight at different points in the sentenc180
ing process, with, say, retribution receiving more weight up front?
What types of release opportunities—for example, compassionate release versus earned release—are necessary to satisfy Graham’s man181
date? The Court avoided these and similar questions, leaving it “for
the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms
182
for compliance,” while setting the stage for further interventions
183
down the road.

180

Cf. Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 407-10 (proposing the parole jury as
a mechanism to turn some of these normative questions over to the people).
181
See John A. Beck, Compassionate Release from New York State Prisons: Why Are So Few
Getting Out?, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 216, 227 (1999) (explaining the difference between
compassionate and earned release and noting that, unlike earned release, “compassionate release is not a mechanism to reduce the sentence of inmates who have somehow paid their debt to society” and therefore “is justifiably viewed as a dispensation,
rather than a right”). Some courts already have begun grappling with these issues,
asking, for instance, whether compassionate release programs satisfy Graham. See Bell v.
Haws, No. 09-3346, 2010 WL 3447218, at *9-11 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2010) (holding that a
sentence of fifty-four years to life that would have made a juvenile prisoner first eligible
for parole at age sixty-nine complied with Graham), vacated on other grounds sub. nom.
Bell v. Lewis, No. 10-56405, 2011 WL 6364713 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2011); Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 401-02 (Va. 2011) (holding that Virginia’s compassionate
release statute, which allows for conditional release after a prisoner reaches the age of
sixty-five, satisfies Graham by providing a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”);
cf. People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 881 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a sentence of eighty-four years to life imposed upon a juvenile violates Graham “because it
amounts to a de facto sentence of life without parole”).
182
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
183
The Court has taken a similar approach before. Atkins v. Virginia prohibited execution of the mentally retarded while “leav[ing] to the State[s] the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of
sentences.” 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)). Panetti v. Quarterman refined the
prohibition on execution of the insane announced in Ford v. Wainwright and rejected as
inadequate the lower court’s procedures for determining insanity. 551 U.S. 930, 952
(2007). But Panetti reserved judgment on “whether other procedures, such as the opportunity for discovery or for cross-examination of witnesses, would in some cases be
required under the Due Process Clause.” Id. As Carol and Jordan Steiker observe, this
gradualist approach to implementing the Eighth Amendment might lessen opposition
to the Court’s interventions while still allowing it to refine and announce both substantive and procedural principles and to police outlier states for compliance. Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and Procedure in the
Constitutional Regulation of Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 737-39 (2008); see also
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At the same time, substantive considerations were not irrelevant.
But by tying substantive considerations to the availability of parole, the
Court embraced a broad, eclectic range of substantive values. Proportionality, as a doctrinal matter, no longer concerns only standard
penological goals like deterrence and retribution. It also recognizes
amorphous and softer values like “self-recognition of human worth
184
The
and potential,” “renewal,” and “reconciliation with society.”
Court’s acknowledgment that these concerns matter to punishment
validity could encourage the creation of procedural spaces that foster
forgiveness, reintegration, and healing as a legitimate part of criminal
185
It may even be that, as Graham’s implications unfold,
sentencing.
courts will explicitly consider and weigh these values in assessing both
states’ compliance efforts in general and parole boards’ decisions in
individual cases.
C. Increasing the Importance of Sentencing Explanations
Finally, Graham’s use of parole lays the foundation for the increased importance of sentencing explanations at the back end of the
sentencing process. Despite the Court’s repeated reaffirmation of
states’ discretionary powers over release decisions, and despite the intentional mushiness of its substantive guideposts, the Court made clear
186
that the required second look must be “meaningful.” The most natural way to enforce that command while still respecting states’ prerogatives would be for lower courts to insist on more robust back-end
sentencing explanations, much as courts reviewing administrative
agency decisions demand reasoned explanations but defer to an agen187
Parole, with its regularized, adcy’s judgment regarding substance.

Steiker, supra note 36, at 299-301 (discussing institutional costs and benefits of procedural and substantive approaches to Eighth Amendment regulation).
184
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
185
See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 55, at 130-45 (discussing mechanisms, such
as victim-offender mediation, by which criminal law could promote expressions of remorse, apology, and reconciliation). The Court had hinted in the past that such values
matter to the Eighth Amendment. See sources cited supra note 94.
186
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
187
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (holding that a court reviewing agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard should ensure that the agency has considered relevant data, statutory
factors, and important aspects of the problem, but should not “substitute its judgment
for that of the agency”); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.5, at 407-13 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing review of agency reasoning).
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ministrative processes, provides a comparatively good vehicle for that
188
approach. As Michael O’Hear points out, such explanation review is
“methodologically distinct . . . from the sort of substantive review exemplified . . . by Eighth Amendment proportionality review,” asking
only whether sentencers have justified their decisions without going
189
further to ask whether those decisions could be justified at all.
How much of an explanation courts should require, and the rigor
with which they should scrutinize the explanations they do receive, will
need to be worked out over time. Lower federal courts are currently
grappling with similar issues in the front-end sentencing context in the
wake of Rita v. United States, which established that within-Guidelines
sentences in federal cases are presumptively reasonable, while leaving
unsettled just how thoroughly those sentences must be explained un190
der 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
Whatever the resolution of that issue, it
seems clear that the effectively pro forma explanations now common
in parole proceedings should no longer be enough to satisfy Graham’s
command. At a minimum, courts should insist upon assurances that
parole boards have engaged in the individualized, granular determinations that Graham contemplated by considering and weighing evidence
bearing on the offender’s specific circumstances. While courts should
not substitute their own substantive judgments for those of parole
boards, they should police boards’ decisions for arbitrariness and unreasonableness. This could mean, for example, requiring boards to
identify the considerations that played the most important role in

188

“Second-look” juries and executive clemency, by contrast, do not. The former
might bump up against the tradition of jury secrecy; the latter might bump up against
separation of powers concerns and the prerogative of the executive to grant clemency
for virtually any reason, including reasons that have little to do with the individualized
considerations that Graham had in mind.
189
Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentencing Explanations: Learning from the
Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009) (discussing appellate
review of trial court sentencing determinations). As both O’Hear and scholars of administrative law recognize, “at the margins, explanation review can shade into substantive review, for an explanation cannot truly count as an explanation if some minimal
standards of substantive rationality are not met.” Id. at 752; see also PIERCE ET AL., supra
note 187, § 7.6, at 417-20 (discussing differences between procedural and substantive
review of agency decisionmaking, and noting that even procedural review can lead
judges to take a position on the merits).
190
551 U.S. 338, 354 (2007); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006) (requiring a sentencing judge, at the time of sentencing, to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence”); Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 (“[W]e cannot read the
statute as insisting upon a full opinion in every case.”); Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining
Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 469 (2009) (“Rita effectively transformed a requirement for explicit explanation into a requirement for implicit explanation.”).

Bierschbach FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

Proportionality and Parole

5/15/2012 11:34 AM

1787

their decision, to discuss how those considerations influenced the decision, and to respond to any significant arguments made by the of191
fender or his lawyer. It could also mean that courts reviewing a longserving offender’s case might insist on increasingly stronger justifications for a refusal to release as time goes by, particularly where the offender had committed a nonviolent crime or where the victims,
prosecutor, or community members either support or do not object to
release. Before Graham, some courts reviewing parole denials already
192
had taken tentative steps down this path. Graham will likely accelerate that development. Increased use of back-end sentencing explanations might eventually help to create a feedback loop between frontand back-end sentencers, further refining substantive proportionality
norms and fleshing out the content and limits of concepts like restora193
tion and reconciliation.

191

See O’Hear, supra note 189, at 752 (arguing for such requirements in the context
of appellate review of front-end sentencing); cf. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 187, § 7.6, at
413-20 (describing similar requirements applicable to “hard look” review of agency
decisionmaking); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 47-49) (on file with author) (arguing for application of similar requirements to sentencing and the charging
and plea-bargaining decisions that influence it).
192
See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 539 (Cal. 2008) (holding that where “evidence
of the inmate’s rehabilitation and suitability for parole . . . is overwhelming,” the “immutable circumstance” of the original offense of conviction does not “inevitably support[] the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public safety”
(emphasis omitted)); see also Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 546-47 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the state governor’s reliance on a “stale and static” factor in reversing the
parole board’s grant of parole violated due process), vacated en banc, 603 F.3d 546 (9th
Cir. 2010); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a habeas
claim resulting from denial of parole, but stating that “continued reliance in the future
on an unchanging factor” could ultimately “result in a due process violation”), overruled
by Hayward, 603 F.3d 546; Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 287 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)
(finding parole board’s repeated denial of parole based solely on the severity of the
original crime without assessment of inmate’s current parole risk to be arbitrary and
capricious); Gordon v. Alexander, 592 F. Supp. 2d 644, 653 n.60 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(granting plaintiffs leave to replead procedural due process claim if they could allege as
a factual matter that parole appeals were “governed by an unofficial policy or practice
that effectively eliminates the possibility of parole for prisoners serving indeterminate
sentences based on ‘stale and static factor[s]’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hayward,
512 F.3d at 546-47)).
193
See Chanenson, Guidance from Above, supra note 6, at 189-94; Chanenson, The Next
Era, supra note 6, at 381.
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CONCLUSION
Graham recognized the significance of parole—and, implicitly,
back-end sentencing generally—to the constitutional regulation of
punishment. As I have tried to show in this Article, that significance
cannot be understood solely in terms of substantive proportionality
concepts like individual culpability and punishment severity. It also
encompasses broader procedural and institutional concerns that aim
at more granular, individualized, and reliable sentencing—concerns
not just over what sentences are, but also over who sentences and how.
If taken seriously, Graham’s view of parole could result in more textured, considered, and just sentences, ones that seek not only to deter
and condemn but also to further restoration, reconciliation, and other
soft but important values the Court saw as being bound up in parole.
But that is a big if. Just as a myopic focus on substance can obscure procedure, the reflexive use of procedure also can undermine
substantive goals that procedure is supposed to serve. The Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has a history of mixing the two in a
194
way that is not always productive. In the case of parole, a black box
of individualization, without more, could do more harm than good,
giving front-end sentencers an easy out, pushing discretion into an
even more opaque body, and making it seem as if life without parole
punishments for juveniles are largely off the table when in fact no one
195
is released. It is far too early to know whether the constitutional vision of parole suggested by Graham will be borne out. But appreciating the complexity of parole’s relationship to the Eighth Amendment
at least enables us to grapple more fully with the promises and pitfalls
that lie ahead.

194

See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 183, at 725-30 (arguing that by deregulating the procedural means of enforcing Atkins’s prohibition on sentencing mentally
retarded offenders to death, the Court has functionally impaired the prohibition itself); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 127, at 426-38 (arguing that the Court’s procedural
regulation of capital punishment has done little to enhance the reliability or fairness of
the death penalty while at the same time giving the appearance of meaningful judicial
oversight).
195
Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 183, at 733-34 (arguing that “the announcement
of substantive rights that are undermined by ineffective procedures for implementing
or enforcing those rights can be a particularly pernicious mode of constitutional regulation” because it can cause the public to “believe or be persuaded that this country’s
death penalty practices are less problematic than they really are”).

